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ABSTRACT
The problem examined in this thesis is whether the cur-
rent structure for the command and control of combat service
support for Army special operations forces (ARSOF) is ade-
quate for all ARSOF support units. This thesis is focused at
the internal sustainment of ARSOF during contingency
operations.
The objective of this thesis is to conduct a comparative
analysis of three alternative ARSOF support command and con-
trol structures to the support structure for the infantry
division (light) to determine if the current ARSOF support
command and control structure can be improved. The three
ARSOF alternatives are: 1) the current ARSOF support
organization, 2) the proposal by the U.S. Army Special
Warfare Center and School and the U.S. Army Infantry Center
to create a special operations support unit and a ranger
support battalion, and 3) the author's proposal to create a
special operations support command (SOSCOM). The analysis is
based on the following measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for
an efficient planning support structure: 1) "tooth-to-tail"
ratio, 2) the number of support planning nodes/channels, 3)
the proximity of support planning nodes to each other, and
4) the number of organic and nonorganic support units.
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The main conclusion of the research is that the SOSCOM
proposal is the most comparable support structure to the
infantry division (light) support structure, based on the
defined MOEs. The major recommendation of this thesis is for
the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School to initiate a
collective feasibility study with the U.S. Army Logistics
Center and the U.S. Army Infantry Center to determine the
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The research in this thesis focuses on the internal
sustainment of Army special operations forces (ARSOF).
Specifically, it will investigate the need to establish a
special operations support command which would coordinate and
manage continental United States (CONUS) and outside the
continental United States (OCONUS) logistical support for
both garrison based and deployed ARSOF units.
1. Baseline Force Structure
This thesis concentrates on five active duty
components of the army special operations forces and the
three active duty support organizations which are designated
to coordinate for or provide support to ARSOF. Table 1-1 and
Table 1-2 list the ARSOF units and the support organizations
which are designated to provide ARSOF support. The tables
show the baseline force structure for the thesis. Chapter IV
of the thesis provides a detailed description of each ARSOF
component and the three support organizations. Table 1-3 is
a list of three possible task force configurations which
ARSOF could operate under.
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a- Army Special Operations Forces: Baseline
Structure
Table 1-1 lists the five components of ARSOF
which require support [Ref. 1:pp. 85-88]. Chapter IV
describes each component in detail in terms of mission and
organic support capabilities. The 75th Ranger Regiment is
comprised of a regimental headquarters and three geographi-
cally dispersed ranger battalions. The U.S. Army Special
Forces Command contains the special forces groups. The 96th
civil affairs battalion (CAB), the 4th psychological opera-
tions group (POG), and the 112th special operations
communications battalion (SOCB) round-out the ARSOF force




75th Ranger Regiment 2700
Special Forces Groups 7000 (1400 X 5)
Psychological
Operations Group 1100





Table 1-2 lists the current support organiza-
tions, and their controlling headquarters, which provide or
coordinate for ARSOF logistical support. The theater army
special operations support command (TASOSC) is the ARSOF CSS
planning and coordinating headquarters at the theater army
level and is the primary interface between the theater army
support command and the ARSOF. The TASOSC is a functional
headquarters under the theater army command (TACOM). There
are five TASOSCs, one located in each theater of operation.
The second element of Table 1-2 is the 528th special
operations support battalion (SOSB). The 528th SOSB is a
functional command in the U.S. Army Special Forces Command
(USASFC). The 528th SOSB is designed to provide limited
direct support to ARSOF units conducting contingency
operations [Ref. 2:p. 14-5]. The last organization listed in
Table 1-2 is the ranger support element (RSE). The RSEs are
comprised of U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) units which
are located on the same installations as the ranger
battalions. There are three RSEs, one for each ranger
battalion, which provide limited direct support to deploying
ranger battalions. The RSEs are designed to support the
deployment of a ranger battalion from its home station and,








Command (TASOSC) 500 (100 X 5)
528th Special Operations
Support Battalion 150
Ranger Support Element 360 (120 X3)
Total Force 910
b. Army Special Operations Task Force: Baseline
Structure
Army special operations forces operate at the
direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of theater
army contingency operations. Typically, an army special
operations task force (ARSOTF) is organized to conduct a
contingency operation. Table 1-3 shows the baseline ARSOTF
composition used during the analysis portion of the thesis.
Table 1-4 lists three types of task force
configurations in which ARSOF could be organized. The three
configurations are given to show the range of the ARSOF
organizational structure in contingency operations.
Configuration A in Table 1-4 is the joint special operations





HQ Ranger Regiment 100
Ranger Battalion 900
Special Forces Team 50
Psychological Operations
Team 10





RANGE OF ARSOF TASK FORCE CONFIGURATION
Configuration Type Location
within Range
A JSOTF Upper limit
B ARSOTF Middle Limit
C ARSOTF Lower Limit
support large contingency operations and is the largest task
force configuration under which ARSOF could operate.
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The JSOTF, as the name implies, is comprised of
special operations forces from each service component. The
CSS for the JSOTF is the responsibility of each unit's parent
service, unless otherwise directed by the JSOTF commander.
The second task force listed in Table 1-4,
Configuration B, is the baseline ARSOTF described in Table 1-
3. This task force is comprised solely of Army special
operations forces and is mid-size in terms of the range of
task force configurations. Configuration B includes
components from each of the ARSOF. The last task force
configuration listed in Table 1-4, Configuration C, is the
smallest configuration under which ARSOF could operate. This
task force is typically organized in support of very
sensitive Army contingency operations (i.e., counter-
terrorism) and could operate within a joint task force or
independently. Configuration C does not include all of the
ARSOF components, but is limited to uniquely trained and
equipped ARSOF.
2. The Problem
The problem examined in this thesis is whether the
current ARSOF support command and control structure (Table 1-
2), designed to support the baseline ARSOF and ARSOTF (Tables
1-1 and 1-3), is the best structure, in terms of planning
efficiency, suited for the command and control of all ARSOF
support assets. The purpose of the analysis is to determine
if an alternative ARSOF support structure is more appropriate
6
for the command and control of ARSOF support assets. The
problem analysis will focus on comparing three alternative
ARSOF support structures to the light infantry division
support structure.
The current movement within the Army special
operations community with respect to ARSOF support doctrine
and structure is to continue establishing the Theater Army
Special Operations Support Commands (TASOSC) [Ref. 3] and to
reorganize the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion
(SOSB) into a special operations support unit (SOSU), so it
can perform dedicated direct support to ARSOF [Ref. 4]. In
addition, effort is underway to establish a dedicated support
unit for the Rangers, a Ranger Support Battalion (RSB) [Ref.
5]. The RSB is designed to replace the RSE structure and
move the command and control from FORSCOM to U.S. Army
Special Operations Command (USASOC).
The value of an adequate ARSOF support structure is
important to the successful completion of special operations
missions. The increased use of ARSOF units and ARSOF
missions in support of national political and economic
objectives makes the formulation of an adequate ARSOF support
structure very critical. According to General Stiner,
Commander USSOCOM, the use of special operations forces is
foreseen to continue into the 1990's.
The crystal ball of the 1990's remains clouded, but one
thing for certain: as long as there is insurgency,
narcotrafficking and terrorism somewhere in the world, the
7
quiet professionals of the U.S. Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) will remain primetime players in the Third World
network of conflict. [Ref. 6]
Two years of experience as the assistant logistician
of the 75th Ranger Regiment allowed the author to see first
hand the various logistical problems that face ARSOF
planners. The sustainment of ARSOF during peacetime, and
within the various levels of the conflict spectrum, is just
as critical as, and may be more critical than, the
sustainment of conventional forces. While ARSOF units and
missions do not place inordinant pressure on the Army
logistical system, ARSOF logistics operations must be
intensively managed in order to support highly classified
special operations.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to conduct a comparative
analysis of three alternative ARSOF support command and
control structures to the conventional light infantry
division support command and control structure and to
determine if the current ARSOF support command and control
structure (Table 1-2) requires realignment. The thesis is
focused on providing recommendations to the ARSOF force
planners and developers in their formulation of a new ARSOF
support structure.
The research has been oriented toward answering the
following questions:
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- Is a special operations support command (SOSCOM)
required to manage all SOF CSS units?
- What would be the appropriate mission and organization
of such a SOSCOM unit?
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This thesis is written to assist decision makers and
force developers in their effort to formulate an adequate
ARSOF support structure. In addition, the thesis is designed
to be used as a reference document for future studies of
ARSOF logistics.
The scope of the research is centered at the internal
logistical support of active duty Army special operations
forces in the low-intensity conflict (LIC) spectrum. The
intended audience of the thesis are ARSOF force developers
and army logisticians with ARSOF CSS exposure.
The thesis analysis is limited to the four measures of
effectiveness (MOEs) defined in Chapter VI. The MOEs were
selected to highlight the complexity of planning ARSOF
logistical support. In addition, the four MOEs used in
Chapter VI for the comparative analysis were chosen within
the scope of the author's knowledge.
The thesis is primarily focused on the peacetine contingency
operations and peacekeeping operations components of the LIC spectrum.
The foreign internal defense, proinsurgency, terrorist
counteraction, and antidrug operation components of LIC have
9
more unique logistics requirements and are not within the
scope of the research.
The research has concentrated on the Army's internal
operational logistics for ARSOF. This thesis attempts to
present the view of the "logistician on the ground" in
discussing the ARSOF support structure and the facts of ARSOF
logistics. The research has been limited to the ground
forces of ARSOF. Army special operations aviation has not
been included in the scope of this research. Special
operations aviation logistical problems are quite different
from those of ARSOF ground forces and time limitations
prevent their inclusion in this research.
D. ORGANIZATION
This chapter has provided an introduction to the thesis.
It has provided the baseline force structure of ARSOF units
and the ARSOF support structure, a general background for the
problem, the objectives of the thesis research, the specific
research questions, and the scope and limitations of the
research. Chapter II describes the methodology of the thesis
and contains a literature review.
Chapter III provides the reader with an overview of
special operations forces within the Department of Defense.
The chapter discusses the historical evolution of low-
intensity conflict and special operations forces, the
10
creation of the current Army special operations forces
command structure.
Chapter IV describes the support capabilities of ARSOF
and the theater army. It describes each ARSOF unit and
explains their organic logistical capabilities. The chapter
also addresses the theater army support structure and
explains the support doctrine in a developed and undeveloped
theater.
Chapter V describes three alternative ARSOF support
structures which provide CONUS and deployed support to ARSOF.
In addition, the author introduces the proposed special
operations support command (SOSCOM) concept as one of the
three alternatives. The chapter also explains the support
structure of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) as a
comparison alternative.
Chapter VI is the comparative analysis of the four
alternatives described in Chapter V. Chapter VI defines four
measures for a command and control support structure:
- Combat Forces-to-Support Forces Ratio.
- Number of support planning nodes/channels.
- Proximity of support planning nodes.
- Number of organic and nonorganic support units.
The comparative analysis of the four support structure
alternatives is then based on the defined measures.
11
Chapter VII discusses the conclusions found from the
analysis in Chapter VI and provides recommendations for
future actions.
12
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
A. METHODOLOGY
The thesis questions presented in Chapter I lend them-
selves to a comparative analysis method of research. The use
of literature reviews, personal and telephone interviews, and
personal and participant observations establish the
foundation of the research.
Four steps were used in conducting the research. The
first step defined the parameters and scope of the problem.
The parameters of the problem were defined as the internal
command and control of ARSOF support units. The scope of the
problem was defined to encompass the logistics doctrine and
force structure of all active army special operations ground
forces operating both in garrison and deployed in support of
contingency operations.
Included in the first step of the research was the
establishment of the current position of the problem relative
to other issues (e.g., the middle-east crisis). Table 2-1
lists the various agencies and organizations which were
contacted during the research in order to determine the
Army's perception of the problem. The research established
that the problem is of great importance in the army special
operations forces and combat services support communities and




J4, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
DCSLOG, United States Army Special Operations Command
(USASOC)
G4, United States Army Special Forces Command (USASFCOM)
XO and S4, 75th Ranger Regiment
54, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion
S4, 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG)
XO, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion
SPO, 7th Infantry Division (Light) Support Command
Concepts and Doctrine Directorate, United States Army
Combined Arms Support Command (PROV)
United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
and School
The second step involved learning about what was done and
is presently being done to change the current ARSOF support
structure. Once again various agencies were contacted to
determine the present status of work on the problems. In
addition to the interviews, past and current literature
written on the topic was reviewed. This phase of the
research revealed that the U.S. Army J.F.K. Special Warfare
Center and School (SWC) was conducting a special operations
forces (SOF) combat service support (CSS) review [Ref. 4] and
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that the U.S. Army Infantry Center (USAIC) was conducting
research on the creation of a Ranger Support Battalion (RSB)
[Ref. 5].
An integral part of this phase of the research was the
collection of pertinent literature. The literature provided
a foundation for the discussion, in Chapter III, on the
evolution of the ARSOF command structure and the logistical
capabilities of the ARSOF units described in Chapter IV.
Step three of the research involved the conduct of a
comparative analysis between the three ARSOF support command
and control structures to the 7th ID(L) support command and
control structure. This step of the research provided the
data to establish the four alternatives for the analysis.
Included in this step was the identification and definition
of the measurements used in comparing the four alternatives.
The conclusions and recommendations, which comprised the
final step, were based on the results of the comparative
analysis conducted in step three.
B. LITERATURE REVIEW
The research encompassed numerous resources. Instrumen-
tal in the research was the use of the various literature
data bases, military sources (interviews and documentation),
and public sources. The data bases which were utilized
included the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
(DLSIE) and the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC).
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The information obtained from these supporting agencies
provided a general literature base from which relevant
information was acquired.
The combat service support of army special operations
forces has been and continues to be an area of concern. In
1989 COL Harper [Ref. 7) addressed the logistical problems of
special operations as 'mission stoppers.' The issues which
were raised by COL Harper pertained to the limited support
capabilities of ARSOF. In addition, COL Harper discussed the
problem of limited to nonexistent theater army support in
undeveloped theaters. COL Harper suggests the establishment
of dedicated support capability or additional organizational
logistics capabilities for ARSOF. In a later article [Ref.
8), COL Harper addresses the fact that logistics for low-
intensity/high-probability conflict received inadequate
attention in training and doctrine during the 1980's. The
article was a case study of logistics in Grenada. The
conclusion of the study emphasized the unwieldy and
inefficient logistic support provided during "no-plan
operations" and recommended higher emphasis be placed on
training logisticians in the support of contingency
operations.
In September 1989 the draft version of thc Operational
Concept for Loaistics SuDDort to Special Operations Forces
delineated the doctrinal concept for logistic support for
ARSOF [Ref. 9]. The document established the basis for the
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evolving doctrine of how logistic support will be provided to
ARSOF in both developed and undeveloped theaters by both
special operations and conventional U.S. Army logistics
units. The operational concept began development after March
1988, after the Army Training and Doctrine Command decided to
include a chapter on logistics support of special operations
units in each of the capstone manuals [Ref. 7:p. 11]. The
draft of the Operational Concevt for Loaistics Support to
Special Operations Forces provided the foundation for the
doctrinal discussion in Chapter IV.
The Operational Concept for Logistics Support to Srecial
Operations Forces [Ref. 9] and Chapter 14 of Field Manual
100-25, "Special Operations Forces" [Ref. 2] provide the
foundation for the establishment of the three alternatives
discussed in Chapter V and the analysis conducted in Chapter
VI. These documents describe the current and evolving combat
service support doctrine for ARSOF in developed and
undeveloped theaters.
The Assessment Re~ort (AR) for the Theater Army S~ecial
O~erations Command (TASOC) [Ref. 3] solidified the need for
an ARSOF support planning and coordinating organization at
the theater army level. The authors' assessment of the TASOC
determined a need to refine the TASOC operational concept
from a command and control organization to a planning and
coordinating organization. The report recommended the
continued development of the TASOC concept and the
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establishment of a TASOC in each of the five theater army
commands. In addition, the report recommended the TASOC be
renamed the Theater Army Special Operations Support Command
(TASOSC). The TASOSC refined the TASOC mission and
organization with the concept of planning and coordinating of
support and sustainment for ARSOF with theater Army (Ref.
3:p. 3].
The current ARSOF CSS Review [Ref. 4], being conducted by
the U.S. Army J.F.K. Special Warfare Center and School (SWC),
is the culmination of past studies and articles, from various
individuals, agencies, and organizations. The review was
'nitiated at the direction of the commander in chief U.S.
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The Review has focused
on ARSOF logistical lessons learned from ARSOF exercises and
Operations Urgent Fury and Just Cause. The Review's purpose
is to determine the shortfalls of ARSOF support at the
theater level and operational level and provide recommenda-
tions to fill the shortfalls.
The SOF CSS Review was started as a direct result of the
after action review comments from Operation Just Cause. The
SOF CSS Review was initiated in April 1990 by the U.S.
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) at the direction of the
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. USSOCOM tasked the U.S.
Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and SWC to review
the ARSOF support requirements. SWC and the Army Logistics
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Center developed a three phase study, the scope of which was
to:
- Determine the required capabilities.
- Determine the available capabilities.
- Determine the capabilities shortfalls.
- Determine the best fix. [Ref. 4)
Phase I of the review, determination of the requirements
and capabilities, was conducted from April to August 1990.
This phase included a subject matter expert study group, the
development of recommendations and a draft operational and
organizational (O&O) concept for the special operations
support unit (SOSU), which would realign the current 528th
SOSB structure. Phase II, development of a recommended ARSOF
support structure, was conducted from August to November
1990. This phase included finalizing the SOSU concept and a
draft and finalized organizational design. The draft SOSU
design is shown in Figure 2-1 [Ref. 4]. The proposal is to
develop the current 528th SOSB into a larger organization
with the capability of providing direct support to all ARSOF
units deployed in support of contingency operations. The
current 528th SOSB personnel strength is 150. The SOSU
proposal would increase that strength to 750 personnel [Ref.
41. The new structure includes the development of a main
support company (MSC), which is to include a materiel
management center (MMC), and three forward area support
companies (FASC). The MSC and FASCs would provide CONUS
19




FORWARD AREA MAIN SUPPORT
SUPPORT COMPANY COMPANY
(STRENGTH APPROX. 750 SOLDIERS1
Figure 2-1 Proposed SOSU Organization
support to ARSOF co-located at their respective installations
and would be capable of deploying overseas in support of
ARSOF conducting contingency operations.
Phase III, implementation of the approved structure, is
scheduled to begin in 1991 [Ref. 4].
The final significant study researched for the thesis is
the Ranger Force Operational and Organizational concept study
being conducted by the U.S. Army Infantry Center (USAIC)
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[Ref. 5]. The proposal being made by the USAIC, through the
study, is to create a ranger support battalion (RSB). The
proposed RSB would provide support to CONUS based and
deployed ranger forces. Figure 2-2 [Ref. 5] shows the
proposed organization of the RSB. The proposed RSB would
contain approximately 400 personnel and would replace the
three RSEs which total approximately 360 personnel. The RSB
would contain three forward support companies (FSC), one for
each ranger battalion, and a headquarters and support company
(HSC). The RSB theory is to replace the RSEs with a support
organization which is controlled by the U.S. Army Special
Operations Command (USASOC) as opposed to the current
organization in which the RSEs are under the control of U.S.





HEADQUARTERS & FORWARD SUPPORT
SUPPLY COMPANY COMPANY
(STRENGTH APPROX. 400 SOLDIERS)
Figure 2-2 RSB Organization
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III. BACKGROUND
This chapter will briefly review the history of low-
intensity conflict and special operations. It will provide
an overview of the Department of Defense (DoD) and Army
special operations command structure.
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The foundation of today's U.S. policy and doctrine on
low-intensity conflict (LIC) and special operations (SO) can
be traced back to the Kennedy administration. This
administration developed a doctrine/policy which was based on
a "multilevel response to the revolutionary threat." [Ref.
l:p. 22] They saw the revolutionary movements in underde-
veloped countries as the latest attempt by the communists to
undermine democracy.
In January, 1961, when President Kennedy asked what the
Pentagon and State Department were doing about guerrilla
warfare, the response he received was that very little was
being done. Revolution, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare
were at the bottom of the list for the nation's policy
makers. The State Department and the Department of Defense
were in the midst of the cold war, battling the Soviet
Union's strategies in Europe and the Chinese Communist threat
23
to East Asia. Underdeveloped countries and their internal
upheavals were considered peripheral to U.S. policy.
By late 1961 President Kennedy felt that a shift from
conventional and nuclear strategies to unconventional
strategies was overdue.
Containment of the Soviet Union through nuclear deterrence
had not proved to be an adequate response to insurgency and
indirect aggression against vulnerable Third World
governments friendly to the United States. Even a
conventional-warfare response seemed inappropriate....
(Ref. l:p. 21]
The President viewed the success of insurgency movements in
Algeria and Indochina, the defeat of the Chinese National-
ists, and budding insurgencies in Southeast Asia as "ominous
portents of trouble to come from unexpected quarters." [Ref.
l:p. 22] President Kennedy's reaction to this "emerging
threat" was to direct his senior advisors to develop a
multilevel response to the revolutionary threat. What
finally emerged was the first comprehensive effort by the
U.S. government to devise a politicomilitary doctrine to
thwart the revolutionary threat. That doctrine has evolved
into the plan which is today used to deal with Low-Intensity
Conflict.
B. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT VERSUS SPECIAL OPERATIONS
At this point it is important to differentiate between
the terms low-intensity conflict (LIC) and special operations
(SO). The primary difference between LIC and SO is that LIC
is confined to a specific portion of the conflict spectrum
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whereas SO extends over the entire range of the spectrum. In
addition, LIC is a type of warfare whereas SO are specific
missions which function in support of various types of
warfare. Figure 3-1 [Ref. 8] shows the three major conflict
areas, low, mid, and high, and their relationship to the
probability of occurrence and the risk associated with that
area. LIC is has high probability of occurrence with a low
risk factor. Special operations are predominately associated
with LIC but may occur over the entire range of the spectrum.
1. The Low-Intensity Conflict Spectrum
Low-intensity conflict has been a difficult concept
for DoD planners and policy makers to define. The debate
over the definition centered around how broad or narrow a
spectrum the LIC doctrine should support. Some strategists,
like Colonel Waghelstein, who commanded U.S. advisors in El
Salvador, felt that LIC was primarily another word for
counterinsurgency [Ref. 1:p. 53]. Other strategists, like
Lieutenant Colonel John M. Oseth, 1984-1985 Army Fellow at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Georgetown University, felt that low-intensity conflict
extended over a broader range of threats. According to LTC
Oseth included in this spectrum are "insurgency and
counterinsurgency operations, terrorism and counterterrorism,
surgical dirc.ct action military operations, psychological
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Figure 3-1 Conflict Spectrum
purpose forces." 8Ref. 10] In 1985 the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) agreed on the following definition:
Low-intensity conflict is a limited politico-military
struggle to achieve political, social, economic, and
psychological objectives. It is often protracted and
ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psycho-social
pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity
conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is
often characterized by constraints on weaponry, tactics,
and the level of violence. [Ref. l:p. 53]
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Low-intensity conflict doctrine for the U.S. Army is
spelled out in several key documents (e.g., Field Circular
100-20, Low-Intensity Conflict"(FC 100-20) and Training and
Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-44, U.S. Army ODerational
Concept for Low Intensity Conflict (TRADOC PAM 525-44)) and
has been subdivided into six mission categories in this
literature. These mission categories are:
- Foreign Internal Defense.
- Proinsurgency.
- Peacetime Contingency Operations.
- Terrorism Counteraction.
- Antidrug Operations.
- Peacekeeping Operations. [Ref. 1:pp. 55-56]
The primary means used by forces to accomplish these
missions are conventional arms and equipment, with some
special operations support.
2. Special Operations
While low-intensity conflicts may be supported by
special operations forces and missions, LIC warfare is
constrained by the parameters established in the JCS
definition. In contrast, special operations support all
levels of the conflict spectrum. These operations are most
prevalent in the LIC part of the warfare spectrum but are
also integral to winning mid- and high-intensity conflicts.
Special operation missions include raids, deep strikes,
disruption of enemy lines of communications and command and
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control, and training of indigenous forces. The use of
special arms and equipment supports the accomplishment of
these missions.
C. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES COMMAND STRUCTURE
1. DoD Special Oerations Command Structure
The revitalization of SOF during the Reagan "build-
up" has continued during the Bush administration. Throughout
the Reagan administration each service continued to improve
separate SO programs. In 1982 the Army established the 1st
Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM) at Fort Bragg, NC.
The Air Force, in 1983, consolidated its SOF and search and
rescue units into the newly created ist Special Operations
Wing (1st SOW) within the 23rd Air Force at Hurlburt Field,
FL. The Navy has established the Naval Special Operations
Command, located at Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, CA.
These unilateral developments led to Congressional claims of
mismanagement of resources and redundancy of effort. The
claims led to the establishment of a new layer of bureaucracy
within the SOF community.
DoD took a number of actions in an attempt to solve
the mismanagement problems. These actions included the
following:
- The Defense Guidance (DG) in 1981 specified that DoD
would develop a special operations capability.
- The DG specification was expanded in 1983 to include the
ability to conduct special operations worldwide by 1990.
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- In 1q84 an advisory council to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA) were
established. (Ref. ll:p. 1-2]
The JSOA mandate is
...to advise the JCS on all aspects of special operations,
including strategy, planning, budget, resource development
and allocation, doctrine, training, and employment of
forces. (Ref. l:p. 84]
In spite of these actions members of Congress
continued to criticize special operations forces. Senator
William S. Cohen (R-ME) stated that special operations forces
remained "scattered among the Services, badly underfunded,
and lacking any clear and coherent mission." [Ref. 12]
In response to Congressional concerns, DoD and
Congress began a debate over the proper resolution to the
management problems. DoD proposed a special operations
command in the "National Capital Region headed by a three-
star flag or general officer to supplement JSOA [Joint
Special Operations Agency]." [Ref. 11:p. 1-2] Within
Congress, the House Armed Services Committee proposed a
separate "National Special Operations Agency" and the Senate
Armed Services Committee's alternative was the establishment
of a "unified combatant command led by a four star officer."
All three proposals were centered around the "perceived need
to streamline the command and control of SOF capabilities and
to develop a common doctrine and strategy for these disparate
[SOF] units." [Ref. 11:p. 1-2]
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The debate ended in 1986 with the passage of the
National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 1987.
Under this law the United States Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) was established at MacDill AFB, FL. This new
unified combatant command is responsible for developing
doctrine, coordinating strategy, and training and equipping
all DoD SOF detachments.
2. Army Special Operations Forces Command Structure
The command structure of Army Special Operations
Forces (ARSOF) has changed numerous times since its
revitalization in the early sixties. The end of WWII saw a
steady decline of special operations units. This post-war
decline was reversed on June 19, 1952 with the activation of
the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG). Over the next ten years
six more SFG's were activated, two in the late fifties and
four more in the early sixties. President John F. Kennedy
was a very strong advocate of the SFG's because they were a
visible tool which supported his new proinsurgency policies
(Ref. l:p. 38].
Vietnam was used by the policy makers to promote the
SFG's and their capabilities [Ref. 1]. The groups were used
in their Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and direct action
roles. In their FID role the SFG's supported the Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam's (MACV) "strategic hamlet
program." This program called for the establishment of
secure self-sustaining economic villages in which the local
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peasants could pursue their way of life [Ref. l:p. 39]. The
SFG's were under the command and control of MACV for these
missions. The groups alao used their direct action mission
capability to support the plans of various U.S. Army division
and corps headquarters.
The use of long-range reconnaissance and surveillance
units by the various U.S. headquarters in Vietnam revitalized
the use of the Ranger type forces which were deactivated at
the end of WWII [Ref. 13:p. F-4]. The Ranger units were
assigned to independent brigade, division, and field force
units and conducted long-range reconnaissance and exploita-
tion operations into enemy held and U.S. denied areas.
Though not formally recognized as special operation
forces at the time, psychological operation and civil affairs
forces were used extensively in Vietnam. These units were
assigned or attached to other units in order to support the
commander's objectives.
The ARSOF command structure during Vietnam was very
decentralized. Each ARSOF unit worked for their supporting
headquarters. There was no formal Army-wide special opera-
tions command. ARSOF units received their logistical support
from the unit they were assigned or attached to at the time.
Their needs were minimal and had little impact on the much
larger logistical concerns of the units the special opera-
tions forces were attached or assigned to.
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After Vietnam, many of the special operation units
were deactivated or relocated into the Reserves. DoD and the
Army had little use for SO units during the seventies. ARSOF
was given low priority on the budget and readiness scale.
The effect that the low priority had on ARSOF can been seen
in a specific special operation mission, the failed attempt
to rescue the Iranian hostages in 1980, Desert One. As a
result of Desert One the Joint Chief's of Staff (JCS) gave
"higher priority to the study of unconventional warfare and
the strengthening of a...special-warfare force.... " [Ref.
14] In addition, in a study for the Congress on military
posture for fiscal year 1983, the JCS stated:
The current special operations forces levels reflect
serious shortfalls in the number and types of units to meet
requirements now and in the remainder of the decade. To
offset this critical shortfall, a measured expansion of
special operations forces is required. [Ref. 14]
The events discussed in the post-mission analysis of
Desert One highlight serious readiness issues that were
facing ARSOF [Ref. 14]. Events in the late seventies and
early eighties showed that there were serious problems in the
ways in which ARSOF were organized, trained, and equipped.
(Ref. 11:p. 1-1]
As a result of these problems, on October 1, 1982 the
Army established the 1st Special Operations Command (1st
SOCOM) at Fort Bragg, NC. 1st SOCOM was established as a
subordinate unit under U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM). 1st
SOCOM became the central command and control headquarters for
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all Army special operations units--Special Forces Groups,
Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, Rangers, Special
Operations Aviation, 112th Special Operations Communication
Battalion (SOC,, and the 528th Special Operations Support
Battalion (SOSB).
On the surface this new command structure looked
simple. All SOF units were to report directly to 1st SOCOM.
1st SOCOM would in turn report to FORSCOM. However, it was
difficult for certain ties to be severed by the SOF units
that came under the new command structure. An example of
this can be seen with the Rangers and FORSCOM. The Rangers
maintained command channels directly and indirectly with
FORSCOM, with 1st SOCOM as an "info addressee." This was
done to facilitate a streamlined command channel for JCS
alert notifications (JCS to FORSCOM to the Rangers). In
addition, the Rangers received their logistical support from
ad-hoc FORSCOM units. These informal command channels
created numerous conflicts in terms of mission tasking and
funding support.
1st SOCOM lobbied to become a separate major command
(MACOM) in order to sever all informal command channels and
receive its own funding authority. In 1988 the Secretary of
the Army, Michael P.W. Stone, approved the idea that 1st
SOCOM would become a MACOM and transition from being a
subordinate unit of FORSCOM. The plan had 1st SOCOM
controlling all SOF including the SOF reserves.
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The establishment of USSOCOM in 1987 and the
subsequent granting of formal funding authority in 1988 had a
significant impact on ist SOCOM's bid to become a MACOM.
Instead of transitioning to a MACOM, 1st SOCOM transitioned
out from under FORSCOM to a subordinate unit to the newly
formed MACOM, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command
(USASOC). In addition to the establishment of USASOC the
Army reorganized its SOF command structure. The 75th
Rangers, Army special operations aviation (ASOA), 4th Civil
Affairs (CA), 96th Psychological Operations Group (POG), and
1st SOCOM (currently called the U.S. Army Special Forces
Command (USASFCOM)) became separate units under USASOC.
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IV. THE LOGISTICS OF ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
This chapter will discuss the organic support
capabilities of ARSOF. A brief explanation of each unit's
organization and mission will be followed by a description of
its organic support capabilities. In addition, the chapter
will discuss the current organizations which are designed to
coordinate for or provide support to ARSOF (TASOSC, 528th
SOSB, and the RSE). Finally, the chapter will explain the
support doctrine for ARSOF in theater army (TA) operations.
A. ARSOF LOGISTICAL CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
The components of Army special operations forces are the
Special Forces Group, 75th Ranger Regiment, Special Opera-
tions Aviation, 4th Psychological Operations Group, and the
96th Civil Affairs Battalion. They function as combat
multipliers to enhance the effects of conventional forces and
can provide the supported commander with unique capabilities.
Some ARSOF units operate under the operational control
(OPCON) of a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), while others
remain under the command of the theater army (TA) commander.
1. Special Forces Grou~s
a. Mission
The special forces are comprised of five active
duty special forces groups (SFG). The SFG's have five
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primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal
defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, and counter-
terrorism.
Zach SFG is composed of a group headquarters
company, a group support company, and three special forces
battalions. The special forces operational detachment A,
also known as the A-team, is the basic SF unit. It is
designed to conduct special operations in remote areas for
extended periods with little external support. The A-team
also serves as a manpower pool for special operations which
do not require the full capabilities of the SF battalion.
This allows the commander to organize tailored SF teams to
conduct specific missions.
b. Organic Support
SFG's have the ability to deploy organizations
which can provide limited support on a unit support basis.
These SF support organizations can be augmented by other
support units in order to support assigned or attached units.
The primary support organization which SFG's deploy is the
special forces operational base (SFOB). The other support
organization which is deployed is the forward operational
base (FOB).
The special forces operational base is a command,
control, and support base established and operated by an SF
Group from organic and attached resources. The SFOB
commander and his staff coordinate and manage the activities
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of one or more FOB's. The FOB is a command, control, and
support base, subordinate to the SFOB, established and
operated by an SF Battalion. The FOB commander and his staff
train, control, and support SF teams in specific areas of
operation. The primary difference between the SFOB and the
FOB is the size and level at which they operate. The SFOB
operates from the group level and is a larger organization
due to the fact that it provides support to one or more FOB.
The capabilities of the SFOB and FOB include:
- Requisition, receipt, storage, and distribution of all
classes of supply.
- Procurement of non-standard equipment.
- Unit level maintenance for all assigned wheeled vehicles
and power generation equipment.
- Unit and DS level maintenance for signal and COMSEC
(communications security] equipment and limited GS
support on SO peculiar communications and electronic
(CE) equipment.
- Unit level maintenance for small arms.
- Limited motor transport services.
- Limited salvage collection.
- Unit level medical support.
- Personnel service support.
- Personnel and cargo parachute packing, rigging of
supplies and equipment for airdrop, and airlift
coordination (e.g., helicopter).
- Medical capability to provide routine and emergency
services. [Ref. 9]
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2. 4th Psychological Operations GrouD
a. Mission
The second component of ARSOF is the 4th Psycho-
logical Operations Group (Airborne). The 4th POG is the only
active duty psychological operations unit. The group
consists of a headquarters and headquarters company, a
Strategic Dissemination Company, a Research and Analysis
Company, and four psychological operations battalions.
Psychological operations units or teams will
deploy as part of a supported unit or task force. The 4th
POG's mission includes the communication of "selected
information and indicators to [enemies] to influence their
emotions, motives, [and] objective reasoning...." [Ref. 7:p.
8] An example of the 4th POG's mission was demonstrated when
General Noriega was seeking refuge in a Panamanian church
during Operation Just Cause. The music and loud speakers
that were used to continuously remind General Noriega of the
strong nearby presence of U.S. military forces were operated
by the 4th POG.
b. Organic Support
For normal logistical support, psychological
operations units rely on the units they are attached to or
supporting. The satisfying of special logistical require-
ments for the psychological operations group is dependent on
theater level or host nation support.
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The group's logistical section is responsible for
the coordination and management of all logistical require-
ments of the 4th POG. Each company and battalion within the
group have logistical personnel which coordinate, manage, and
communicate logistical requirements to the group headquarters
or the supported unit. The major operational equipment to be
supported includes communication systems, printing presses,
and broadcast systems. The major logistical challenge for
psychological operations units is the transportation of their
major operational equipment while deployed and operating in a
theater area of operations.
3. 96th Civil Affairs Battalion
a. Mission
The third component of ARSOF is the 96th Civil
Affairs Battalion (Airborne). The battalion, located at Fort
Bragg, NC is the Army's only active duty civil affairs unit.
It is comprised of four companies, each with a regional
focus.
Civil affairs (CA) teams predominately deploy as
part of a larger force. The mission of CA units is to
- Support the commander in the conduct of military
operations.
- Advise and assist the commander in the fulfillment of
his legal and moral obligations in accordance with
international laws and agreements.
- Further the national and international policies of the
United States. [Ref. 15]
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Civil affairs units or personnel are assigned or
attached to the supported command upon deployment. civil
affairs provides operational support to general purpose
forces, foreign internal defense (FID), unconventional
warfare (UW), and civil administration.
b. Organic Support
As with the 4th POG, civil affairs operational
logistics support is the responsibility of the supported
command. Support requirements are minimal for CA units.
They deploy with very little equipment, if any at all. The
normal size of a CA team is small (3-7 personnel) and has
very little impact on the logistical requirements of the
supported command.
The civil affairs battalion S4 staff is a
planning and coordinating cell. The cell consists of a
logistics officer, an NCOIC, and a supply technician. The
mission of the CA battalion's logistics section is to:
Provide global Civil Affairs logistical support. This
requirement includes (but is not limited to): Property
accountability; Budget; Ammunition support; Service
support; Equipment and supply requisitioning. [Ref. 16)
4. Rangers
a. Mission
The 75th Ranger Regiment is the fourth component
of the ARSOF. The regiment is organized with three geograph-
ically dispersed ranger battalions and a regimental headquar-
ters. The rangers are used in support of the peacetime
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contingency operations, terrorism counteraction, and
peacekeeping operation components of the LIC doctrine. The
mission of the Ranger Reqiment is
...to plan and conduct special military operations. These
operations are conducted by specially trained, equipped,
and organized forces against strategic or tactical targets
in pursuit of national military, political, economic, and
psychological objectives. They may support conventional
military operations or they may be performed independently
when conventional forces cannot be used. (Ref. 17:p. 1-1
Ranger forces can be deployed into an area of
operations (AO) in many different ways. Ranger units can
deploy from their CONUS base directly to the AO. A more
common method would be for the Ranger unit to deploy from a
remote marshalling base (REMAB) or an intermediate staging
base (ISB) before insertion into the AO.
b. Organic Support
The logistical organization of the Regiment is
oriented around the coordination of the filling of support
requirements for the Regiment. The Regimental S4 section
consists of four officers (S4, assistant S4, Resource
Management Officer, and the PBO) and four enlisted (NCOIC,
PBO supply SGT, two clerks). The primary function of the
Regimental S4 is to coordinate and manage the employment of
all logistical support for the Regiment. Ranger units are
supplied with the minimal equipment and personnel which
enable them to flexibly respond and quickly succeed in any
low-intensity conflict or special contingency operation.
"Combat service support consists of the logistical and
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administrative effort to maintain the (Regiment's] ability to
fight." [Ref. 17:p. 8-1]
At the Ranger Battalion level the S4 coordinates
with his supporting headquarters for the required resources
to conduct the battalion's missions. The S4 also coordinates
and directs the actions of the support platoon. The
battalion support platoon provides limited organic support
and coordinates with the Regimental S4 for the filling of
direct support requirements. The platoon also provides
limited support for assigned and attached units. The platoon
consists of a support platoon leader, an ammunition NCO, and
a food service section. The food service section consists of
an NCOIC and eight cooks. The platoon does not have organic
transportation.
B. COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OF ARSOF
In addition to the organic support capabilities of the
ARSOF units, there is one organization located in each
theater which plans and coordinates for ARSOF support: the
theater army special operations support command (TASOSC);
there are two organizations which provide limited direct
support to ARSOF units: the 528th Special Operations Support
Battalion (SOSB) and the Ranger Support Element (RSE); and
there is one unit which provides signal support to ARSOF:
the 112th Special Operations Communication Battalion (SOCB).
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Each support organization is limited in its support
capabilities by it's composition and available resources.
1. Theater Army Special Operations SUDDort Command
The theater army special operations support command (TASOSC)
is a major functional command of the theater army (TA).
Figure 4-1 [Ref. 3] shows the organization of the TASOSC.
The TASOSC consists of the following staff sections:
- Director of Personnel and Administration (DPA).
- Director of Intelligence (DOI).
- Director of Plans and Operations (DPO).
- Director of Logistics (DOL).
- Special Operations Staff Element (SOSE).
- Information Management Office (IMO).
The TASOSC has the mission of planning and
coordinating the support and sustainment of ARSOF within its
respective theater [Ref. 3]. The TASOSC commander and his
staff:
- Plan and coordinate CSS and designated CS for theater
ARSOF and, when directed, other service and allied SOF.
- Plan, coordinate, direct, and supervise CS and CSS
operations of assigned and attached Army forces
providing dedicated direct support to theater ARSOF and,
when directed, other service and allied SOF. [Ref. 3]
The TASOSC DOL is responsible for planning, coor-
dinating, and monitoring all classes of supply, transporta-
tion, maintenance, and field services for deployed ARSOF
units. The DOL coordinates all ARSOF support requirements






Figure 4-1 TASOSC Organization Chart
with the required support through it's subordinate functional
commands and through area-oriented commands.
2. 528th SDecial Operations SUDDOrt Battalion
The 528th Special Operations Support Battalion (SOSB) is
located at Fort Bragg, NC. The battalion was activated in
June 1986 as the 13th SOSB, and redesignated the 528th SOSB
in May 1987. The present mission of the battalion is:
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To provide dedicated administrative logistical [garrison]
support to the Headquarters Army Special Operations Command
(HQ ARSOC). When directed to provide support to other Army
Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). [Ref. 18]
When directed to provide suppor: to other Army Special
Operaticns Forces (ARSOF). [Re'.. 18]
The battalion is compri,;ed of a Headquarters and
Headquarters Company (HHC), Sup )ly Company, Maintenance
Company, and a Transportation Company. Figure 4-2 [Ref. 18]
shows the current organization of the 528th SOSB.
528TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT BATTALION
BATTALION
HEADQUARTERS
HHC SUPPLY MAINT TRANS
COMPANY COMPANY COMPANY
(STRENGTH APPROX. 150 SOLDIERS)
Figure 4-2 528th SOSB Organization
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The 528th SOSB capabilities include the following:
Headquarters Company.
* Medical Section: two teams and [a battalion) aid
station;
* Food Service Section: four mobile kitchen trailers;
* Materiel Management Section.
Supply Company.
* Petroleum Products Section: four forward area
refueling equipment sets; two fuel system supply
points;
* Ammunition Support Section;
* Supply Section.
Maintenance Company.
* Direct support maintenance section;
* Organizational maintenance.
Transportation Company.
* Movement Control Section;
* Light Truck Section: 250 passengers or 150 tons per
lift. [Ref. 18]
The present organization of the battalion is under
evaluation as part of the SOF CSS Review. Recommendations by
the J.F.K. Special Warfare Center and School include the
addition of a Materiel Management Center (MMC) and a respon-
sive, deployable direct support capability.
3. Ranaer SUDDort Element
The Ranger Support Element (RSE) is an ad hoc support
unit which is established when directed by the Ranger
Regiment. The RSE is a special support element provided by
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host installation commanders at CONUS posts where ranger
units are stationed. Figure 4-3 shows the generic RSE
organization. It consists of elements and teams from either
U.S. FORSCOM TOE CS and CSS units stationed at the
installation or from the table of distribution and allowances
(TDA) organizations under the command of the installation
commander. Each RSE maintains the same readiness posture as
its supported ranger battalion. However, the RSE elements
are only activated and collectively organized when the
rangers receive alert notification.
The RSE provides the necessary logistical support to
ensure the timely and efficient deployment of a ranger
battalion. The mission of the RSE is to provide all the
support needed to outload and deploy a ranger unit from CONUS
[Ref. 17:p. 8-1]. During CONUS deployments, the RSE is
responsible for both the departure and the reception support
provided to the ranger battalion. During outside continental
United States (OCONUS) deployments, the RSE is responsible
for initial deployment and continuing OCONUS support until
the deploying ranger force is under the operational control
(OPCON) of the supported unified command or joint task force
(JTF).
When the ranger battalion is deployed overseas, the
responsible theater commander assumes support of the ranger
battalion at the remote marshalling base (REMAB) or the





SUPPLY TRANS MEDICAL MAINT
SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION
ENG INTEL MESS CURITY
SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION
(STRENGTH APPROX. 120 SOLDIERS)
Figure 4-3 RSE Generic Organization
the ranger battalion to move directly to the objective area
from CONUS, the RSE continues support of the ranger battalion
until released by the theater commander, and is prepared to
accept considerable augmentation assets if necessary. The
RSE provides the following support:
- Furnishing meals that are either served by a supporting
unit in an established facility or taken to the ranger
battalion at an isolated location.
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- Issuing supplies from existing stocks, or from
contingency items stored for use by the ranger
battalion.
- Transporting supplies, food, personnel, and equipment.
- Palletizing equipment and ammunition for air movement
and airdrop.
- Rigging vehicles and equipment for airdrop.
- Refueling vehicles and equipment.
- Issuing barrier and construction material for building
of rehearsal sites.
- Helping in the construction of rehearsal sites and
targets.
- Securing, storing, moving, and issuing ammunition and
other Class V items.
- Maintaining ranger weapons and equipment, to include
communications equipment. This is normally done by
maintenance contact teams.
- Setting up and operating the RSE emergency operations
center.
- Securing the REMAB if it is in CONUS. [Ref. 17:p. 2-8]
4. 112th Special Operations Communication Battalion
The 112th Special Operations Communication Battalion (SOCB)
provides communications support to all ARSOF. The 112th SOCB
has the ability to install, operate, and maintain full
communications with the unified commander, the ARSOF
headquarters, subordinate commands, supported units, and host
nation liaison. [Ref. 7:p. 9] The battalion accomplishes
its support mission by providing the supported command the
capability to communicate through the use of FM and/or HF
radio and satellite communications. The SOCB is also capable
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of providing direct support maintenance for all ARSOF
communications equipment. One example of its mission
capabilities was seen during Operation Just Cause. The
battalion deployed a communications team to the headquarters
of the 75th Ranger Regiment in order to augment the
Regiment's existing communications capabilities. The 112th
SOCB is comprised of a headquarters detachment and two signal
companies.
C. THEATER ARMY SUPPORT OF ARSOF
1. The Doctrine
The doctrine presented in this section is currently
in draft form and is continuing to evolve. The U.S. Army
Logistics Center and the J.F.K. Special Warfare Center and
School are working together to develop a doctrine which will
fully integrate ARSOF support into conventional theater army
support doctrine.
The developing doctrine can be divided into two
components: 1) ARSOF support in a developed theater and,
2) ARSOF support in an undeveloped theater or undeveloped
periphery of a developed theater. The logistical operations
within the latter component are considered contingency
support operations. The common bond between these two
components is that each ARSOF operation, regardless of the
theater's development, requires some combination of developed
theater and contingency support.
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The primary planning and coordinating organization at
the TA level for ARSOF is the theater army special operations
support command (TASOSC). The TASOSC's have evolved from the
original concept of the theater army special operations
command (TASOC). Though not all are fully established, a
TASOSC will be organized in each of the five unified
commands.
a. Support Doctrine for ARSOF in Developed Theaters
The logistical support of ARSOF in a developed
theater is the same as conventional forces support. A
developed theater is defined as:
...a theater in which the Echelons Above Corps (EAC)
logistic structures are in place and capable of supporting
and sustaining units assigned or attached to the theater
command. [Ref. 2]
In addition, prepositioned war reserve materiel stocks
(PWRMS) and operational project stocks are in place and host
nation support (HNS) agreements exist. At the time of this
research, the Central Command (CENTCOM) theater is the
nearest of the five theaters to being fully developed in
terms of its theater support structure.
The ARSOF task force commander and his staff
coordinate all their requirements through the TASOSC. The
TASOSC director of logistics (DOL) is the primary link
between the ARSOF commander and the established theater army
support structure.
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The exception to the procedures stated above is
the support of special operations (SOF) peculiar equipment.
SOF-peculiar equipment usually involves very high technology,
and in many cases is mission specific. These items must be
intensively managed and must be identified to the TA support
structure as SOF-peculiar. ARSOF commanders must arrange for
procedures that will ensure that the items are supported.
This is done through the use of the support contingency
principles which are discussed in the next section.
b. Support Doctrine for ARSOF in Undeveloped
Theaters and the Undeveloped Periphery of
Developed Theaters
Army special operations forces support procedures
in undeveloped theaters and the undeveloped peripheries of
developed theaters are quite different from the developed TA
support doctrinal component. An undeveloped theater is
defined as a theater where the logistics base is not fully
established. For the majority of situations, except general
war, all five theaters are undeveloped in terms of their
support structure (the current exception is CENTCOM). Under
peacetime conditions the theater support structures are
provided minimum personnel and equipment to maintain their
peacetime mission. Consequently, the theater support
structures are undeveloped.
The periphery of a developed theater is defined
as an area of operations of a developed theater which extends
beyond the capabilities of established TA support structure.
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The peripheries are more prone to low-intensity conflict
during mid- to high-intensity conflicts within the theater.
An example would be if the European theater erupted into a
major conflict between NATO and the Soviet Union. Northern
and central Europe would be established as a developed
theater while the southern littorals and north Africa would
remain undeveloped. In this case, the southern flank of the
European Command would be an undeveloped periphery.
For long duration contingency operations
conducted in an undeveloped theater or in the undeveloped
periphery of developed theaters there is no significant
theater sustainment base. "These SO are best considered
contingency operations, even if they occur during protracted
conflict." [Ref. 2] When ARSOF units are deployed into
these conditions they must deploy enough resources to allow
them to accomplish their mission until theater support
structures are established or arrangements for HNS are made.
ARSOF support planners must apply their knowledge
of conventional logistics operations to meet the specific
needs of the mission or scenario. The planners have numerous
options from which to choose when planning and coordinating
support for ARSOF missions. Figure 4-4 [Ref. 2] shows the
support options available to ARSOF logistics planners. In
addition, ARSOF support planners must apply as many of the
support contingency principles as are practical when
supporting ARSOF in undeveloped theater situations. Table
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Figure 4-4 ARSOF CSS Support Options
4-1 (Ref. 2] lists the support contingency principles. The
importance and application of each principle varies and is
dependent on the specific contingency operation.
The command and control structure established for
the contingency operations will have a direct impact on the
procedures which are followed in order to obtain logistical
support for ARSOF. The majority of special operations will




Maximize use of host nation support, to include local
and third country supplies, services, and other
resources.
Maximize use of existing facilities.
Limit CSS requirements to mission essential.
Minimize handling of supplies.
Concentrate maintenance efforts on returning major end
items to service.
Rely on air lines of communication for resupply.
Maximize use of accompanying supplies, pre-positioned
stocks, and preplanned resupply packages.
Identify to the TA as early as possible those items that
require operational readiness floats or other special
logistics arrangements.
force (JSOTF). When a JSOTF is established, the JSOTF
commander may provide the direct support, if available to him
from his service component, or he may authorize ARSOF units
to request support through their parent units or directly
from the CONUS wholesale logistics system.
Logistical support of ARSOF in an undeveloped
theater and the undeveloped periphery of a developed theater
will vary depending on the mission and scenario. A bare base
support system may be established to provide support from
CONUS, from within the theater, from afloat amphibious ships
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or mobile sea bases, or from a third country. The bare base
method involves the establishment of a temporary support
structure which is capable of supporting a specific
contingency operation. Under these conditions the TASOSC
remains the primary coordinating headquarters for ARSOF
logistical requirements. In a developed theater the TASOSC
coordinates with the TA support structure only. The
difference in undeveloped theaters and the undeveloped
periphery of developed theaters is that the TASOSC may
coordinate with joint commands, HNS, or directly with ARSOF
support units in order to provide the required support.
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V. SUPPORT COMMAND AND CONTROL ALTERNATIVES
This chapter describes three alternative ARSOF support
command and control structures. In addition, the light
infantry division (LID) support command and control structure
is discussed as a comparison alternative. The chapter is
designed to explain the support command and control
alternatives which will be used in Chapter VI f3r the
comparative analysis. The alternatives are explained in
general support concept terms. It is not the intent of this
chapter to educate the reader on the specifics of providing
direct support to combat units. The intent of this chapter
is to provide the reader with the general support concepts
used under each alternative.
The ARSOF support alternatives are developed to provide
support to the baseline ARSOTF organization which was
introduced in Chapter I, Figure 1-3, Configuration B. The
three support alternatives discussed below are organized to
support the ARSOTF conducting a contingency operation at the
Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), in Fort Chaffee, AK.
The light infantry division support structure comparison
alternative is organized to support a light infantry brigade
task force conducting a similar contingency operation at the
JRTC. The ARSOTF and light infantry brigade task force
exercises are explained in Section A below.
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Section B discusses the four alternative command and
control support structures. The types of units and support
structures involved in alternatives 1 and 4 have been
exercised at the JRTC. Alternatives 2 and 3 are postulated
notional structures based on alternative one's structure.
Alternative 1 is the baseline support force structure
described in Chapter I. Alternative 2 is the force support
structure, described in Chapter II, that is being proposed by
the U.S. Army J.F.K. Special Operations Warfare Center and
School [Ref. 4] and the U.S. Army Infantry Center [Ref. 5].
Alternative 3 is the author's proposal to consolidate the
ARSOF support command and control structure by creating a
Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM). Alternative 4,
the infantry division (light) support structure, is provided
as the comparison alternative.
A. JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER SCENARIO
This section explains similarities and differences
between the ARSOTF JRTC exercise conducted in April 1989 and
the 7th Infantry Division (Light) (7th ID(L)) brigade task
force JRTC exercise conducted in October 1990. Table 5-1 is
a summary of the similarities and differences. The JRTC is
designed to train and evaluate units which conduct low-
intensity and special operations. The JRTC training scenario
requires a unit to deploy on short notice (within an 18 hour
period) in support of a five to seven day contingency
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operation in the notional small island country of Cortina.
Cortina is located in an undeveloped theater and the U.S.
logistical structure within the area of operation is limited
to the deploying unit's organizational and deployable direct
support assets.
TABLE 5-1
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES OF JRTC EXERCISES
Similarities
7th ID(L) and ARSOF task force:
* Deploy on short notice in support of a small
island contingency operation in an undeveloped
theater.
* Air lines of communication are used on emergency
basis only.
* 5-7 day duration with multiple missions.
Differences
7th ID(L) task force:
* No theater support structure is available.
* Deployed organic functional direct support units.
* Deployed strength: combat & CS forces = 1800
CSS forces = 220
total force = 2000
ARSOTF:
* Limited area support group support is available.
* Host nation support is available.
* Deployed 'ad-hoc' direct support CSS units.
* Deployed strength: combat & CS forces = 1100
CSS forces = 200
total force = 1300
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1. 7th Infantry Division (Light)
The 7th Infantry Division (Light) (7th ID(L))
deployed a brigade task force from Fort Ord, CA to JRTC in
October 1990 [Ref. 19]. The combat forces portion of the
task force consisted of a light infantry brigade headquar-
ters, a light infantry maneuver brigade, a field artillery
battery, and an air defense artillery company. The brigade
task force was also augmented with combat support (CS) units
which consisted of an engineer company, a military police
platoon, a military intelligence platoon, and a signal
platoon. The division also deployed a forward area support
team (FAST) from the division support command (DISCOM). The
FAST was comprised of a supply and services company, a
maintenance company, and a medical company. The DISCOM
forward area support coordinator (FASCO) received operational
control of the FAST prior to the exercise planning phase and
maintained control of it throughout the exercise.
The task force total deployed strength was approxi-
mately 2000 soldiers [Ref. 18]. The combat and combat
support (CS) forces strength was approximately 1800, while
the CSS forces, the DISCOM FAST, strength was approximately
200. The DISCOM FAST was designed to support the combat
units for seven to ten days.
The training scenario limited the use of air lines of
communication (ALOC) to emergencies only. The task force
support requirements were fulfilled in line with specific
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"rules" for logistical support. The rules were in line with
theater army support doctrine for conventional forces
conducting contingency operations.
2. Army Special Operations Task Force
The deployment of the Army special operations task
force (ARSOTF) to JRTC in April 1989 provided significant
logistical challenges to the deploying task force and The
JRTC staff [Ref. 20]. The ARSOTF was configured as explained
in Figure 1-3, configuration B. The ARSOTF total strength
was approximately 1300 [Ref. 20]. The combat and combat
support (CS) force strength was approximately 1100, while the
CSS force strength was approximately 200. The ARSOTF was
comprised of a ranger battalion and the ranger regimental
headquarters, a civil affairs and psychological operations
team, and a special forces detachment. The Ranger Regimental
commander was designated the ARSOTF commander and was
responsible for providing support to the task force.
The ARSOTF deployed units from Fort Bragg, NC (528th
SOSB, a civil affairs team, and a psychological operations
team), Fort Benning, GA (Headquarters Ranger Regiment) and
Fort Lewis (1st SGF, 2d Ranger Battalion, and the RSE).
The supporting units included an "ad-hoc" deployed
element of the ranger support element (RSE) and a portion of
the 528th SOSB. The RSE portion consisted of direct support
CS and CSS units. The RSE CS consisted of engineer,
security, counter-intelligence, and signal support. The RSE
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CSS units consisted of a supply and services section, a small
arms and wheeled vehicle maintenance section, and a motor
transport section. The 528th SOSB portion consisted of CSS
units which included a motor transport section, a small arms
and wheeled vehicle maintenance section, a mess section, and
a medical team. Because the exercise extended beyond the
five day period that organic support resources of the
deployed units could cover, the JRTC staff had to develop new
rules and new logistical concepts for the ARSOTF. The new
rules and concepts included the establishment of an area
support group (ASG) staff on Cortina and the allowance for
the ARSOTF to buy goods and services from the local economy
(contracting for host nation support).
B. SUPPORT COMMAND AND CONTROL ALTERNATIVES
This section describes three command and control
alternatives for support for both CONUS based ARSOF and an
ARSOTF deployed in support of a contingency operation. Each
alternative is divided into a CONUS based support structure
discussion and a deployed support structure discussion. The
ARSOTF contingency operation scenario used throughout is as
described in Section A above. The fourth alternative is
included as a comparison alternative. The fourth alternative
explains the support command and control structure for the
7th ID(L) in CONUS and deployed in support of the same
contingency operation as described above. Each alternative
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lists the support organization(s) which provide direct
support for supply and services (S/S), ammunition support
(CLV), maintenance (small arms and wheeled vehicle), trans-
portation, and medical treatment.
1. Alternative 1: Baseline Structure
This alternative is based on the current ARSOF
support structure. The baseline units were explainad in
Chapter I. Table 5-1.1 and Table 5-1.2 summarize the
following discussion on alternative 1.
TABLE 5-1.1
ALTERNATIVE 1: CONUS-BASED SUPPORT COMMANDS
Unit SPT'D S/S(1) CLV(2) MAINT TRANS MED
HQ, RGR RGT 36th ENG 36th ENG 36th ENG 36th ENG
1st BN, RGR 260th QM 260th QM 260th QM 260th QM
2d BN, RGR 80th ORD 80th ORD 80th ORD 80th ORD
3d BN, RGR 36th ENG 36th ENG 36th ENG 36th ENG
SFG MMD/SOSB - - D/SOSB---------
POG SOSB SOSB SOSB SOSB
CAB SOSB SOSB SOSB SOSB
SOCB SOSB SOSB SOSB SOSB
NOTES:
(1) Supply and Services.
(2) Training ammunition (CLV) is in all cases provided by
the local installation ammunition supply point.
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TABLE 5-1.2
ALTERNATIVE 1: DEPLOYED ARSOTF SUPPORT STRUCTURE
Unit SPT'D S/S CLV(1) MAINT TRANS MED







(1) CLV support was received from the general support
ammunition company within the theater or from CONUS.
(2) Provides all DS for ARSOTF, less CLV.
a. CONUS Support Structure
Table 5-1.1 lists the major functional support
commands. The CONUS-based ranger units are provided direct
combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) from
their respective Ranger Support Element (RSE). The RSE
supporting the 1st Ranger Battalion, located at Hunter Army
Airfield (HAAF), GA, is organized under the 260th
Quartermaster Battalion (260th QM). The RSE supporting the
2d Ranger Battalion, located at Fort Lewis, WA, is organized
under the 80th Ordnance Battalion (80th ORD). And the RSE
supporting the Ranger Regimental Headquarters and the 3d
Ranger Battalion, located at Fort Benning, GA, is organized
under the 36th Engineer Group (36th ENG). Each RSE is
comprised of different FORSCOM direct support CS and CSS
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units located at each installation. The RSEs, when formed,
are organized with the following units and provide the listed
support:
FUNCTIONAL AREA HAAF TLEWIS FT BENNING
Combat Service Support:
Command 260th QM 80th ORD 36th ENG
Supply 260th QM 80th ORD 36th ENG
Maintenance 632d MAINT 80th ORD 36th ENG
Medical 260th QM 62d MED 34th MED
Transportation 260th QM 80th ORD 36th ENG
Combat Support:
Counter Intel 124th MI I CORPS Unidentified
Signal 260th QM 9th SIG 36th ENG
Security Installation 9th ID Installation
Engineer 92d ENG 864th ENG 36th ENG
The five Special Forces Groups (SFG) are also
geographically separated and receive their CONUS support from
an installation materiel management division (MMD) or from
the 528th SOSB. The following list identifies each SFG,
their location, and from what organization they receive their
CONUS support:
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SFG COMMAND LOCATION SUPPORTING UNIT
1st SFG FT LEWIS, WA MMD
3d SFG FT BRAGG, NC 528th SOSB
5th SFG FT CAMPBELL, KY MMD
7th SFG FT BRAGG, NC 528th SOSB
10th SFG FT DEVENS, MA MMD
The MMDs coordinate for direct support to fill
the requirements received from their respective SFGs. The
requirements are filled through the use of installation table
of distribution and allowances (TDA) assets and TOE assets.
The 528th SOSB provides all direct support for the two SFGs
located at Fort Bragg, NC.
The final three components of the ARSOF, the
civil affairs battalion, the psychological operations group,
and the special operations communication battalion, are
located at Fort Bragg, NC. Consequently, they receive their
direct support from the 528th SOSB.
b. Deployed ARSOTF Support Structure
The army special operations task force (ARSOTF)
configuration introduced in Chapter I, configuration B, is
the ARSOTF which will be used in the analysis for all three
alternatives. The configuration includes elements from all
of the ARSOF units introduced in Chapter I and described in
Chapter IV. The ARSOTF organized for the JRTC contingency
operation exercise described in Section A above is the same
as explained in Chapter I. Table 5-1.2 is a summary of the
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following discussion on the command and control structure
which supported the deployed ARSOTF.
The support structure for the ARSOTF JRTC
exercise in April 1989 included elements of the 2d Ranger
Battalion's RSE, the 80th Ordnance Battalion from Fort Lewis,
WA and the 528th SOSB from Fort Bragg, NC. The support
organization provided direct support for supply and services,
maintenance (small arms and wheeled vehicle), transportation,
and medical. Ammunition resupply support (CLV) was provided
by the theater combat service support asset. The ARSOTF
support organization was as follows:
FUNCTIONAL AREA PROVIDING UNIT
Command 80th ORD
Supply and services 80th ORD and 528th SOSB
Maintenance 80th ORD and 528th SOSB
Transportation 80th ORD and 528th SOSB
Medical 528th SOSB
2. Alternative 2: SWC and USAIC ProDosal
The following alternative is based on the proposals
by the J.F.K. Special Warfare Center and School (SWC) [Ref.
4] and the U.S. Army Infantry Center (USAIC) [Ref. 5] which
were discussed in the literature review section of Chapter
II. The proposals include the expansion of the 528th SOSB
organization and the creation of a Ranger Support Battalion
(RSB).
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a. CONUS Support Structure
Table 5-2.1 summarizes the following discussion.
Under this alternative, the proposal by the USAIC (Ref. 4]
has the CONUS-based ranger units being provided direct
support from the Ranger Support Battalion (RSB). The RSB
headquarters and a forward support company (FSC) are co-
located with the Ranger Regiment headquarters and the 3d
Ranger Battalion at Fort Benning, GA. The 1st Ranger
Battalion, located at Hunter Army Airfield (HAAF), GA, is
supported by another forward support company from the RSB.
Finally, the 2d Ranger Battalion, located at Fort Lewis, WA,
is supported by the third forward support company from the
RSB. Each RSB forward support company is identical to the
other and is comprised of functional support units which
provide direct support for supply and services, maintenance,
transportation, and medical.
The special forces groups (SFGs), under the
J.F.K. SWC proposal [Ref. 4], receive their CONUS support
from the main support company (MSC) or from a forward area
support company (FASC) from the special operations support
unit (SOSU). The 3d and 7th SFGs, located at Fort Bragg, NC,
would receive their direct support from the main support
company of the SOSU which would be co-located with the SFGs
and the SOSU headquarters at Fort Bragg, NC. The 1st SFG,
Fort Lewis, WA, the 5th SFG, Fort Campbell, KY, and the 10th
SFG, Fort Devens, MA receive their direct support from one of
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TABLE 5-2.1
ALTERNATIVE 2: JFK SWC AND INFANTRY CENTER PROPOSAL, CONUS
Unit SPT'D S/S(1) CLV(2) . MAINT TRANS I MED
HQ, RGR RGT --------------- RSB, FSC-----------------
1st BN, RGR --------------- RSB, FSC-----------------
2d BN, RGR --------------- RSB, FSC-----------------
3d BN, RGR --------------- RSB, FSC-----------------
SFG ---------- SOSU, MSC or FASC------------
POG -------------- SOSU, MSC-----------------
CAB -------------- SOSU, MSC-----------------
SOCB -------------- SOSU, MSC-----------------
NOTES:
(1) Supply and Services.
(2) Training ammunition (CLV) is provided by the local
installation Ammunition Supply Point.
the three forward area sul t companies which would be
located on each respective installation. The main support
company (MSC) and forward area support companies (FASC) would
provide direct support for supply and services, transporta-
tion, and maintenance.
Finally, the civil affairs battalion, the
psychological operations battalion, and the special
operations communication battalion, all located at Fort
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Bragg, NC, would also receive their support from the main
support company of the SOSU.
b. Deployed Support Structure
The baseline ARSOTF, under this alternative,
would be provided direct support from a support organization
comprised of functional direct support units from the RSB and
the SOSU. Table 5-2.2 provides a summary of this discussion.
The actual deployed support force configuration would be
dependent on the ARSOTF commander's guidance. Using the
ARSOTF organization for the April 1989 JRTC exercise, the
hypothesized support organization, using the proposed SOSU
and RSB, would consist of the following:
FUNCTIONAL AREA PROVIDING UNIT
Command RSB HQ
Supply and services RSB and SOSU
Maintenance RSB and SOSU
Transportation RSB and SOSU
Medical SOSU
3. Alternative 3: SOSCOM ProDosal
This alternative is based on the author's proposal to
create a special operations support command (SOSCOM). The
SOSCOM concept is described below followed by the alternative
3 hypothesized CONUS and deployed support structures.
a. Special Operations Support Command Concept
The proposal to formulate a special operations
support command (SOSCOM) is focused toward: 1) streamlining
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TABLE 5-2.2
ALTERNATIVE 2: JFK SWC AND INFANTRY CENTER
PROPOSAL, DEPLOYED








(1) CLV support received from the general support
ammunition company within the theater or from CONUS.
the ARSOF support command and control structure, for both
CONUS and deployed ARSOF, by providing a single headquarters
for the ARSOF direct support functional units; 2) reducing
the personnel resources at the theater army level by
replacing the five TASOSC's organization and personnel with
liaison teams from the proposed SOSCOM headquarters; and 3)
facilitating simple ARSOF support planning and communications
channels through a centrally controlled planning node located
at the SOSCOM headquarters. The proposed SOSCOM structure is
modeled on an infantry division (light) DISCOM. Figure 5-1
shows a simplified comparison of the proposed SOSCOM concept
with respect to the light infantry DISCOM.
The light infantry DISCOM acts as the division's
central planning and coordinating organization for all
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Figure 5-1 DISCOM-SOSCOM Comparison
support requirements. The SOSCOM would provide the same
function for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command
(USASOC). The RSB and the SOSU would become functional units
within the SOSCOM. In addition, the materiel management
center (MMC) would be removed from the proposed SOSU
organization and placed under the direct control of the
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SOSCOM in order to coordinated all supply and service
requirements for the SOSCOM functional units.
Figure 5-2 shows the proposed SOSCOM organization
and the functional units organized within the SOSCOM command.
The approximate strength of the proposed SOSCOM is 1100
personnel. The RSB would continue to support the ranger
battalions and the regimental headquarters through the
forward support companies located at each respective
installation. The SOSU would also continue to support the
SFGs, civil affairs battalion, psychological operations
group, and the special operations communications battalion
with the main support and forward area support companies.
The SOSCOM headquarters and MMC would be developed and given
resources by using the theater army special operations
support command (TASOSC) personnel and the 528th SOSB MMC
personnel. The TASOSCs would be removed from the theaters
and consolidated within the SOSCOM headquarters.
The proposed SOSCOM headquarters is shown in
Figure 5-3. The SOSCOM headquarters organizati,-. would be
similar to the headquarters section within a light infantry
DISCOM. The administration section would operate the same as
a DISCOM administration section by providing personnel and
administrative support to the SOSCOM. The intelligence/
operations section would include the following.
(1) The Intelligence Branch. The intelligence
branch is responsible for the collection and dissemination of
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Figure 5-2 SOSCOM Organization
all mission oriented intelligence; the requisitioning and
issuing of maps, and, in conjunction with the Civil Affairs
Battalion, creating and maintaining an active world-wide
logistics intelligence database.
(2) The Plans and Operations Branch. The plans
and operations branch is responsible for all operational
planning and mission taskings; establishes and maintains all
operations plans (OPLANS).
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Figure 5-3 SOSCOM Headquarters Organization
(3) The Communications Branch. The communica-
tions branch is responsible for the coordination and
management of all communications requirements for the
headquarters.
(4) The Movements Control Branch. The movements
control branch is responsible for the coordination and
management of all transportation requirements for the
headquarters and subordinate units.
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The planning and coordination of ARSOF
theater army support requirements would be accomplished
through five liaison (LNO) teams which would be detached from
the SOSCOM and located in each theater army command. The LNO
teams would replace the TASOSC organization and provide the
SOSCOM a central planning point within each theater. The
next major functional sections within the SOSCOM headquarters
would be five theater area support coordinators (TASCO), each
with a specific theater responsibility. The TASCO would have
a function similar to the forward area support coordinator
(FASCO) of a light infantry DISCOM. The TASCO would receive
operational control of the ARSOF support units (i.e., RSB and
SOSU) supporting operations within his theater. The TASCO
would be the interface between the TASOSC LNO team, the
SOSCOM, and the ARSOTF.
Figure 5-4 shows the TASCO organization during an
ARSOTF deployment. The RSB and SOSU functional units would
form a forward area support team (FAST) which would be
controlled by the TASCO. The FAST would be comprised of a
RSB forward support company and a SOSU forward area support
company and/or elements from the SOSU main support company
during contingency operations. The TASCO would receive
operational control of the FAST, and become the focal
planning and coordinating node, during ARSOTF deployments.
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Figure 5-4 TASCO Organization
The final section within the SOSCOM headquarters
would be the command logistics section. This section would
be responsible for meeting the logistics needs of the SOSCOM
headquarters.
b. CONUS Support Structure
Under the proposed SOSCOM, the CONUS support
structure for ARSOF would be similar to that of the
alternative 2 CONUS support structure. Table 5-3.1
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summarizes the support structure for this alternative. The
RSB would support its respective ranger battalions through
forward support companies (FSC). The SOSU would support the
respective SFGs, civil affairs battalion, psychological
operations group, and special operations communication
battalion with the forward area support companies (FASC) or
the main support company (MSC).
TABLE 5-3.1
ALTERNATIVE 3: SOSCOM PROPOSAL, CONUS
Unit SPT'D S/S(l) CLV(2) I MAINT TRANS MED
HQ, RGR RGT --------------- RSB, FSC-----------------
1st BN, RGR --------------- RSB, FSC-----------------
2d BN, RGR --------------- RSB, FSC-----------------
3d BN, RGR --------------- RSB, FSC-----------------
SFG ---------- SOSU, MSC or FASC------------
POG S ,--------------SOSU MSC---- ------------
CAB -------------- SOSU, MSC-----------------
SOCB -------------- SOSU, MSC ----------------
NOTES:
(1) Supply and Services.
(2) Training ammunition (CLV) is provided by the local
installation Ammunition Supply Point.
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c. Deployed Support Structure
The baseline ARSOTF, under the SOSCOM alterna-
tive, would be provided direct support from a forward area
support team (FAST). Table 5-3.2 is a summary of the
following discussion. The FAST would be under the
operational control of its respective TASCO. The TASOC would
be responsible for coordinating with the SOSCOM theater LNO
and the ARSOTF when deploying the FAST into the theater in
support of contingency operations. The FAST support
organization is comprised of functional direct support units
from the RSB and the SOSU. The composition of the direct
support units within the FAST is similar to Alternative 2
support structure, deployed. The actual support force
configuration would be dependent on the ARSOTF commander's
guidance. Using the ARSOTF organization for the April 1989
JRTC exercise, the hypothesized support organization would
consist of the following:
FUNCTIONAL AREA PROVIDING UNIT
Command FASCO






ALTERNATIVE 2: JFK SWC AND INFANTRY CENTER
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(1) CLV support is received from the general support
ammunition company within the theater or from CONUS.
4. Alternative : 7th ID__DISCOM
This alternative is presented as a comparison
alternative to the three previous ARSOTF support structure
alternatives. The support structure presented below is based
on the support structure of the 7th Infantry Division (Light)
for both the CONUS support of one maneuver brigade and the
deployed support of one maneuver brigade task force. The
alternative structure for the deployed brigade task force is
presented using the 7th ID(L) JRTC scenario described in
Section A above. Table 5-4 summarizes the following
discussion.
The support structure for the CONUS based maneuver
brigade is comprised of units from within the DISCOM. The
forward area support coordinator (FASCO) is the central
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TABLE 5-4
ALTERNATIVE 4: 7TH ID(L) DISCOM
Unit SPT'D S/S CLV MAINT TRANS MED
CONUS supply supply maint trans med
Maneuver BDE company company company platoon company
Deployed I I
BDE TF FAST (1) FAST----------
NOTES:
(1) CLV support is received from the general support
ammunition company within the theater or from CONUS.
coordinating agency for filling the brigade's support
requirements. The FASCO coordinates with the functional
units within the DISCOM to provide the required support to
the brigade. While in CONUS the functional support units are
under the operational control of their parent organizations.
The following list shows the functional area, the providing
unit, and the parent organization which:
FUNCTIONAL AREA PROVIDING UNIT PARENT ORG
Supply supply company 7th S&T BN
Maintenance maint company 707th MAINT BN
Medical medical company 7th MED BN
Transportation trans platoon 7th S&T BN
The support structure which deploys in support of a
mcneuver brigade task force is comprised of the same
functional units that provide support to the maneuver brigade
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in CONUS. The functional units are consolidated under the
forward area support team (FAST) and out from under their
parent unit operational control. The FAST moves under the
operational control of the FASCO for the duration of the
operation. The FASCO is the central planning and
coordinating agency for the brigade task force support
requirements for the operation.
C. SUMMARY
The intent of this chapter was to provide the reader with
the general support concepts used under each alternative.
The chapter provided three alternative ARSOF direct support
command and control structures. In addition, the light
infantry division (LID) support command and control structure
was discussed as a compariso, alternative. The chapter was
designed to explain the support command and control
alternatives which will be used in Chapter VI for the
comparative analysis. The alternatives were explained in
general support concept terms. Table 5-5 is a summary of the











Civil affairs 528th SOSB
PSY OPS 528th SOSB
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CONUS Centrally located DISCOM (S&T BN,
maneuver brigade MAINT BN, MED BN)
Deployed Brigade task force FASCO
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VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
This chapter will concentrate on comparing the support
structures of the three ARSOF alternatives (alternatives 1,
2, and 3) to the light infantry division support structure
(alternative 4) discussed in Chapter V. The comparison is
focused at answering the research questions presented in
Chapter I and restated below.
- Is a special operations support command (SOSCOM)
required to manage all SOF CSS units?
- What would be the appropriate mission and organization
of such a SOSCOM unit?
The basis for comparing the three ARSOF alternatives to
the DISCOM is the similarity between the ARSOF and infantry
division (light) missions (see Chapter V) and the similari-
ties between the sizes of the forces requiring support.
The method used to conduct the analysis will focus on
comparing and contrasting four measures of effectiveness
(MOE) for a command and control support structure. The MOEs
which will be used and are defined in Section A below are the
combat-to-combat service support strength ratio ("tooth-to-
tail"), the number of support planning nodes/channels, the
proximity of the support planning nodes to each other, and
the number of organic and nonorganic support units.
Section B of the chapter provides the comparative
analysis of the four alternatives based on the MOEs defined
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in Section A. The analysis will be conducted based on the
two exercises conducted at the Joint Readiness Training
Center (JRTC), Fort Chaffee, AK which was discussed in
Section A of Chapter IV. Each of the four alternatives will
be compared and contrasted within each stated measure. The
purpose of the analysis is not to determine the optimal
solution for an ARSOF command and control support structure,
but to determine which of the three ARSOF support
alternatives presented in Chapter IV is most comparable to
the light infantry division support structure in terms of
command and control. The premise for the determination is
that the infantry division (light) command and control
support structure is an established and accepted support
structure. Consequently, we will assume that the ARSOF
support structure alternative which most closely resembles
the light infantry DISCOM structure, in terms of the MOEs for
a command and control support structure, will provide
appropriate command and control for ARSOF support units.
A. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR A COMMAND AND CONTROL
SUPPORT STRUCTURE
This section defines the four measures for a command and
control support structure which will be used in the
comparative analysis of Section B. The measures are: 1)
combat force-to-support force ratio, 2) number of support
planning nodes/channels, 3) the proximity of the support
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planning nodes to each other, and 4) number of organic and
nonorganic support units.
1. Combat Force-to-Support Force Ratio
The combat force-to-support force ratio is defined as
the gross number of support troops required to support a
certain number of combat troops. This ratio is also known as
the "tooth-to-tail" ratio. For the purpose of this analysis
the ratio does not take into consideration the occupational
specialty, the skill and training, or the rank structure of
the support personnel. The ratio is computed by determining
the gross number of support soldiers used to support a
certain number of combat soldiers for a specific exercise.
The conclusions drawn from the ratio will determine if the
ARSOF alternatives are similar to the light infantry division
alternative.
2. Number of SuDDort Plannina Nodes/Channels
The number of support planning nodes/channels is
computed by totaling all the support communications channels
and planning nodes used during the planning phase of the
operation. The conclusion which can be drawn from this
measure is that the greater the number of channels and nodes
used during CSS planning the greater the chance for planning
errors. Consequently, the smaller the number of planning
nodes/channels the less chance for planning errors.
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3. Proximity of SUDDort Planning Nodes
This proximity factor is used to measure the distance
between the support planning nodes prior to the start of the
exercise. The measurement is based on the distance which
separates the planning nodes identified in measure 2 above
times the estimated relative volume of communication between
the nodes. The estimated volume of communication is based on
the author's two years of experience planning support for
ARSOF operations. The reason for this measurement is to
highlight the possible existence of barriers to communication
which may adversely affect the support planning process and
have a negative impact on mission support. The conclusion
which can be drawn from this measure is that the greater the
distance between planning nodes, the greater the chance for
planning errors. Thus, the smaller the distance the fewer
the planning errors.
4. Number of Organic and Nonoraanic Support Units
The number of organic and nonorganic support units
measurement is computed by totaling all the deployed support
units which are organic to the deployed CSS command and
control headquarters plus the support units which are not
organic to the CSS command and control headquarters but are
under the operational control of the CSS headquarters for the
exercise only. The measurement is used to determine the
number of support units which are assigned by a table of
organization and equipment (TOE) under the command and
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control of the deployed support command headquarters.
Consequently, a determination can be made of the relationship
that exists between the deployed support units and the
support command and control headquarters.
If the deployed functional support units are organic
to the deployed support headquarters and within the
functional command of the deployed combat force, then the
command and control relationship is likely to be better than
if the deployed functional support units are not organic to
the deployed support headquarters and not within the
functional command of the deployed combat force. The basis
for this assumption is that organic units tend to form
habitual support relationships with the supported combat unit
which are superior to the sporadic relationships which are




Due to the sensitive nature of actual unit end
strengths, the figures presented in this section are
approximations based on the research of the current
literature.
a. Alternative 1: Baseline Force Structure







approximately 1000 personnel [Ref 21]. The following list











RSE 360 (120 X 3)
528th SOSB 150
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(1) CONUS-Based. The total CONUS-based baseline
ARSOF is approximately 11600 personnel [Ref l:pp. 85-88].
The total CONUS-based ARSOF support organizations have
(2) Deployed. The total strength of the
baseline deployed ARSOTF is approximately 1100 personnel (Ref
20]. The total strength of the deployed ARSOTF support
structure is approximately 200 personnel [Ref. 20]. The















b. Alternative 2: SWC and USAIC Proposal






(1) CONUS. The total CONUS-based baseline ARSOF
is approximately 11600 personnel [Ref. 1:pp. 85-88]. The
total CONUS-based ARSOF support organizations as proposed by
the J.F.K. SWC and the USAIC would contain approximately 1645
personnel [Refs. 4,5]. The following list shows thp breakout














(2) Deployed. The total strength of the
baseline deployed ARSOTF is approximately 1100 personnel
[Ref. 20]. The total strength of the deployed ARSOTF support
structure is approximately 200 personnel [Refs. 4,5]. The













c. Alternative 3: SOSCOM Proposal






(1) CONUS. The total CONUS-based baseline ARSOF
is approximately 11600 personnel [Ref 1:pp. 85-88]. The
total CONUS-based ARSOF support organizations as proposed by
the author contain approximately 1100 personnel. The












(2) Deployed. The total strength of the
baseline deployed ARSOTF is approximately 1100 personnel
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[Ref. 20]. The total strength of the deployed ARSOTF SOSCOM
support structure, the FAST, is approximately 200 personnel.












d. Alternative 4: 7th ID(L) DISCOM






(1) CONUS. The total CONUS-based maneuver
brigade contain approximately 3000 personnel [Ref. 19]. The
total CONUS-based maneuver brigade support organizations,
from the DISCON, is approximately 200 personnel [Ref. 19].
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(2) Deployed. The total strength of the
deployed brigade task force is approximately 1800 personnel
[Ref. 19]. The total strength of the deployed brigade
support structure, the FAST, is approximately 200 personnel









2. Number of SUDnort Planning Nodes/Channels
a. Alternative 1: Baseline ARSOTF Deployed
Figure 6-1 shows the support planning nodes and
channels for the support of the baseline ARSOTF. Table 6-5














b. Alternative 2: SWC and USAIC Proposal, Deployed
Figure 6-2 shows the support planning nodes and
channels for the support of alternative 2, the J.F.K. SWC and
USAIC proposal. Table 6-6 summarizes the number of planning
nodes and channels.
Planning Nodes/Channels: SWC & USAIC
ARSOTF m
m RSB SOSU m
0 : Node
: Channel






c. Alternative 3: SOSCOM Proposal, Deployed
Figure 6-3 shows the support planning nodes and
channels for the support of alternative 3, the SOSCOM command
and control structure. Table 6-7 jummarizes the number of













d. Alternative 4: 7th ID(L) DISCOM, Deployed
Figure 6-4 shows the support planning nodes and
channels for the support of alternative 4, the 7th ID(L)
DISCOM structure. Table 6-8 summarizes the number of













3. Proximity of Support PlanninQ Nodes
a. Alternative 1: Baseline ARSOTF Deployed
The distance between the support planning nodes
under alternative 1 are summarized in Table 6-9. The
locations of each support planning node are shown in Figure
6-5.
TABLE 6-9
ALT 1 SEPARATION OF NODES
Planning Nodes Separation Volume of Comm.
% per year
ARSOTF - FORSCOM 150 mi 21
ARSOTF - SOSB 400 mi 9
ARSOTF - RSE 2500 mi 29
FORSCOM - RSE 2 mi 32
RSE - SOSB 3000 mi 9
FORSCOM - SOSB NOT USED 0




C - 528th SOSB
D - RSE
Figure 6-5 Alternative 1 Planning Node Locations
b. Alternative 2: SWC and USAIC Proposal, Deployed
The distance between the support planning nodes
under alternative 2 are summarized in Table 6-10. The




ALT 2 SEPARATION OF NODES
Planning Ne.,es Separation Volume of Comm.
%per year
ARSOTF - SOSU 400 mi 20
ARSOTF - RSB 2 mi 50
RSB - SOSU 400 mi 30




Figure 6-6 Alternative 2 Planning Node Locations
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c. Alternative 3: SOSCOM Proposal, Deployed
The distance between the support planning nodes
under alternative 3 are summarized in Table 6-11. The
locations of each support planning node are shown in Figure
6-7.
TABLE 6-11
ALT 3 SEPARATION OF NODES
Planning Nodes Separation Volume of Comm.
% per year
ARSOTF - SOSCOM 400 mi 100





Figure 6-7 Alternative 3 Planning Node Locations
d. Alternative 4: 7th ID(L) DISCOM, Deployed
The distance between the two support planning
nodes under alternative 4 are summarized in Table 6-12. The




ALT 4 SEPARATION OF NODES
Planning Nodes Separation Volume of Comm.
% per year
BDE TF - DISCOM 3 mi 100
Weighted AVG Dist. 3 mi 100
A -DE TF
8 DISCOM
Figure 6-8 Alternative 4 Planning Node Locations
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4. Number of Organic and Nonorganic Support Units
a. Alternative 1: Baseline ARSOTF, Deployed
The support command and control headquarters for
the baseline ARSOTF for the April 1989 JRTC exercise was the
80th Ordnance Battalion. Table 6-13 shows the number of
organic and nonorganic support units under the operational
control of the 80th Ordnance Battalion for the exercise.
TABLE 6-13
ALT 1: BASELINE ARSOTF, DEPLOYED
80th ORD BN
ORGANIC NONORGANIC
Supply section Signal section
Maintenance section Medical section






Total = 4 Total - 7
b. Alternative 2: SWC and USAIC Proposal, Deployed
The support command and control headquarters for
the SWC and USAIC alternative, based on the hypothesized
organization using the ARSOTF commander's guidance for the
April 1989 JRTC exercise, is the Ranger Support Battalion
(RSB). Table 6-14 shows the number of organic and nonorganic
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support units which would be under the operational control of
the RSB for the exercise.
TABLE 6-14




Maintenance section supply section
Transportation platoon maintenance section
Mess section trans section
Signal section mess section
Medical section
Engineer section
Total - 7 Total - 4
c. Alternative 3: SOSCOM Proposal, Deployed
The support command and control headquarters for
the SOSCOM alternative, based on the hypothesized organiza-
tion using the ARSOTF commander's guidance for the April 1989
JRTC exercise and the SOSCOM concept discussed in Chapter V,
is the TASCO responsible for the theater in which the
exercise occurs. Table 6-15 shows the number of organic and
nonorganic support units which would be under the operational
control of the TASCO for the exercise.
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TABLE 6-15










Total - 7 Total - 0
d. Alternative 4: 7th ID(L) DISCOM, Deployed
The support command and control headquarters for
the 7th ID(L) DISCOM alternative, based on the JRTC exercise
in October 1990, is the FASCO responsible for supporting the
deployed brigade task force. Table 6-16 shows the number of
organic and nonorganic support units which would be under the
operational control of the FASCO for the exercise.
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TABLE 6-16
ALT 4: 7TH ID(L) DISCOM, DEPLOYED
Forward Area Support Ooordinator
ORGANIC NONORGANIC






Total - 6 Total - 1
5. Summary of Analysis
Table 6-17 provides a summary of the above
comparative analysis based on the defined four measures of
effectiveness of a command and control support structure.
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TABLE 6-17
SUMMARY TABLE OF THE ARSOTF--7TH ID(L) SPT STRUCTURE
MOEs for Support Command and Control
Alternatives (1) (2) (3) (4)
ALT 1 CONUS 23:1 N/A 1063.1 N/A
ALT 1 Deployed 5.5:1 N=4/C=5 N/A 0=4/N=7
ALT 2 CONUS 10:1 N/A 201 N/A
ALT 2 Deployed 5.5:1 N-3/C-3 N/A 0=7/N=4
ALT 3 CONUS 10:1 N/A 400 N/A
ALT 3 Deployed 6:1 N=2/C=1 N/A O=7/N=0
ALT 4 CONUS 10:1 N/A 3 N/A
ALT 4 Deployed 9:1 N=2/C= N/A 0=6/N=1
NOTES:
(1) "Tooth-to-Tail" Ratio
(2) # of CSS planning nodes (N)/Channels (C)
(3) Proximity of CSS planning nodes (AVG miles)
(4) # of Organic (0) and Nonorganic (N) SPT units
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VII. SUMMARY. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
A. SUMMARY
The research in this thesis focuses on the internal
sustainment of Army special operations forces (ARSOF). This
thesis is written to assist decision makers and force
developers in their effort to formulate an adequate Army
special operations forces (ARSOF) support structure
particularly when these forces are deployed in undeveloped
theater areas outside the United States.
The problem examined in this thesis is whether the
current ARSOF support command and control structure (Table 1-
2), which is designed to support the baseline ARSOF and
ARSOTF (Tables 1-1 and 1-3), is the best structure, in terms
of both planning efficiency and suitability for the command
and control of all ARSOF support assets. The purpose of the
analysis was to determine if an alternative ARSOF support
structure is more appropriate for the command and control of
ARSOF support assets.
One of the objectives of this thesis was to compare
three alternative ARSOF support command and control struc-
tures to each other and to the conventional infantry division
(light) support command and control structure. A second
objective of this thesis was to determine if the current
ARSOF support command and control structure (Table 1-2)
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requires realignment. The analysis was conducted with the
use of four measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for a command
and control support structure. The four MOEs used were: 1)
"tooth-to-tail" ratio, 2) the number of support planning
nodes/channels, 3) the proximity of the support planning
nodes to each other, and 4) the number of organic and
nonorganic support units.
The thesis focused on providing recommendations to the
ARSOF force planners and developers in their formulation of a
new ARSOF support structure. The research has been oriented
toward answering the following questions:
- Is a special operations support command (SOSCOM)
required to manage all SOF CSS units?
- What would be the appropriate mission and organization
of such a SOSCOM unit?
B. CONCLUSION
The analysis conducted in Chapter VI was intended to help
determine which of the three alternative ARSOF support
structures is most comparable, in terms of planning
efficiency, to the infantry division (light) support command
(DISCOM) in supporting a contingency operation. The basis
for comparing the three ARSOF alternatives to the DISCOM is
the similarities in the ARSOF and infantry division (light)
missions and the similarities in the size of the force
requiring support.
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The MOEs are ranked in the following order for the
purpose of drawing conclusions from the four alternative
support structures. The ranking is based on the importance
of the MOE in terms of efficient planning communications
channels.
- Number of support planning nodes/channels.
- Number of organic and nonorganic support units.
- Proximity of the support planning nodes.
- "Tooth-to-tail" ratio.
Table 7-1 summarizes the comparison results of the three
alternative ARSOF support structures to the infantry division
(light) DISCOM irom Chapter VI. It shows Alternative 3, the
Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM), is the most
comparable to the DISCOM with respect to the number of
support planning nodes. In addition, Alternative 3, the
SOSCOM proposal, is also comparable to the DISCOM with
respect to the number of organic and nonorganic support units
and with respect to the "tooth-to-tail" ratio. Finally, the
table shows that Alternative 2, the SWC and USAIC proposal,
is the most comparable to the DISCOM with respect to the




ALT 1 ALT 2 ALT 3 ALT 4
MOE BASELINE SWC & USAIC SOSCOM DISCOM
(1) N-4/C=5 N=3/C=3 N=2/C=l N=2/C=I
(2) 0=4/N=7 0=7/N=4 O=7/N=0 0=6/N=1
(3) 1063.1 201 400 3
(4) 5.5:1 5.5:1 6:1 9:1
NOTES:
(1) # of CSS planning nodes (N)/Channels (C)
(2) # of Organic (0) and Nonorganic (N) SPT units
(3) Proximity of CSS planning nodes (AVG miles)
(4) "Tooth-to-Tail" Ratio
The conclusion reached by the results stated above is
that the Special Operations Support Command proposal,
alternative 3, is the most comparable to the DISCOM, based on
the defined MOEs. Consequently, the results indicate that a
Special Operations Support Command is similar to the DISCOM,
and may offer more efficient planning channels than alterna-
tives 1 and 2. The appropriate mission and organization of
the SOSCOM is as described under alternative 3 in Chapter V.
C. RECOMMENDATION
1. Creation of a Special Operations Support Command(SOSCOM1
Recommend that the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special
Operations Warfare Center and School initiate a collective
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feasibility study with the U.S. Army Logistics Center and the
U.S. Army Infantry Center for the creation of a Special
Operations Support Command (SOSCOM) to provide command and
control for all active ARSOF combat support and combat
service support units. The study would focus on the cost and
operational effectiveness of ARSOF sustainment in creating a
centralized ARSOF support units headquarters. The proposed
SOSCOM organizational structure and concept, described in
Chapter V, are offered as a departure point for the study.
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